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Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty:   
Public Finance Of, By, and For the People  
Timothy A. Canova  
In recent months, there has been a resurgence of interest in 
the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, in no small part because a 
new president, also from Illinois, has openly and repeatedly 
identified with and invoked Lincoln.1  Academic interest in 
Lincoln has mostly focused on the darker side of wartime 
presidential powers, such as the suspension of civil liberties and 
overstepping lines of constitutional authority.  Far less attention 
has been given to Lincoln as the activist executive who set a new 
standard for mobilizing public finance in a crisis, pursuant to 
express Congressional authority under the Legal Tender Acts, 
presidential authority at its zenith.2  There is a modern tendency 
to dismiss any lessons from the past, to believe that we have 
little to learn from earlier ages and that our age is superior to all 
that has come before.3  This is particularly so in the world of 
finance.  Perhaps the great financial crash of 2008 and its grim 
economic aftermath may allow scholars to approach with some 
humility Lincoln’s monetary experiment in issuing greenbacks 
directly into circulation.  Lincoln, after all, did mobilize public 
 
 This paper was presented as part of a panel, “What Would Lincoln Do?:  
Constitutional Approaches to Wartime Finance and Economics,” at the 2009 Chapman 
Law Review Symposium on Lincoln’s Constitutionalism in Time of War, Jan. 30, 2009. 
 Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law and Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs, Chapman University School of Law. 
 1  Lee Siegel, Obama’s Muse: His literary and political inspiration, the career of 
Abraham Lincoln, has a double edge, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2008, at W3; John F. Harris 
and Alexander Burns, Straw Man? Historians say Obama is no Lincoln, POLITICO, Dec. 
15, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1208/16569.html; James Oakes, What’s So 
Special About a Team of Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A43. 
 2  Recall Justice Jackson’s concurrence in the steel seizure case:  “when the 
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 3  According to Ortega y Gasset, “our age is characterized by the strange 
presumption that it is superior to all past time; more than that, by its leaving out of 
consideration all that is past, by recognizing no classical or normative epochs, by looking 
on itself as a new life superior to all previous forms and irreducible to them.”  JOSÉ 
ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 44 (Anonymous trans., W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc. 1957) (1932). 
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finances and therefore public energy on a grand scale that 
continues to elude our own generation.   
Lincoln is remembered for overcoming enormous political 
and military challenges.  Often overlooked, however, is the 
economic and financial chaos he confronted upon taking office.  
In the weeks prior to Lincoln’s inauguration, the nation was 
swept by fear, the hoarding of gold, and a panic perhaps more 
dangerous than other classic Keynesian liquidity traps in March 
1933 and September 2008, since there was no central bank in 
1861 with the authority to issue currency and inject liquidity into 
the financial system to try to break a downward spiral by 
restraining the psychology of hoarding.4 
Lincoln’s approach to public finance was effective.  It 
empowered the federal government with renewed fiscal capacity, 
mobilized a massive army, unleashed great latent energy and 
enormous economic growth.5  As we bemoan the many ills in 
today’s financial marketplace, we may consider what Lincoln 
would do if he was alive today.  Would a president who asserted 
executive control over public finance in time of a great civil war 
do so in our time of obstinate foreign wars and market drama?  
Today the task may be greater, particularly if private financial 
interests have undermined the integrity of regulatory agencies 
and Congress alike.  Of course, if he were alive today, Lincoln 
would also have to contend with all kinds of international 
financial constraints, far different from what he faced in his own 
time.  This should not diminish from Lincoln’s model of national 
economic sovereignty, but should instead prod us to think how 
his approach could be updated and squared with the realities of 
 
 4  ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL 
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 26–27, 39, 44 (John Hopkins Press 1959) (1959).  It is 
somewhat misleading to refer to the decades prior to the Civil War as a period of 
“unprecedented quiescence of monetary issues.”  Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Civil War 
Finance: Lessons for Today, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 596, n. 30 (2009).  This ignores both the 
political and economic turmoil surrounding the First and Second Banks of the United 
States, including the conflict between Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson over the First Bank, constitutional challenges to the 
First Bank, and President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the recharter of the Second Bank on 
constitutional grounds, as well as the financial turmoil that resulted in the wake of these 
disputes.  WILLIAM F. HIXSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 89–120 (1993). 
 5  This was the view of Lincoln articulated by the economic historian Eliot Janeway 
who wrote that Lincoln “never organized the Union for victory – he was too practical to 
try.  Instead, he inspired and provoked it to mobilize the momentum for victory.  The 
result was inefficient but irresistible.  A victory small enough to be organized is too small 
to be decisive.”  ELIOT JANEWAY, THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: A CHRONICLE OF 
ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 16 (Yale University Press 1951).  As argued 
below, it was in part through the Legal Tender Acts that Lincoln was able to provide the 
tools to mobilize. 
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today’s global financial marketplace and national political 
institutions. 
At the time of this writing, the U.S. banking and financial 
system remains in serious trouble, unemployment and home 
foreclosures are at dangerously high levels.  The real economy 
suffered a deep contraction, one of the sharpest drops in history.6  
The recovery appears weak and fraught with danger.  The U.S. 
trade and current account deficits exceed $700 billion a year, 
requiring capital inflows of more than $2 billion a day.7  
Meanwhile, the federal budget deficit has grown from more than 
$485 billion in the final year of the Bush administration to $1.6 
trillion today.8  Now, with the first installment of a bank bailout 
costing $700 billion, a fiscal stimulus package of $787 billion, and 
the Federal Reserve spending another trillion to prop up the 
markets, a big question on the minds of investors and public 
officials around the world is how the U.S. will pay for this 
spending, and whether so much federal borrowing will ultimately 
undermine the value of the dollar and lead to renewed inflation 
and some future financial chaos.9   
This essay will consider Lincoln’s financing of the Civil War 
and its possible application to today’s crisis.  Lincoln expanded 
the scope of federal authority by creating the nation’s first fiat 
currency since the American Revolution, a strategy that was seen 
by many, including himself, as necessary to the financing of the 
Union’s military efforts.10  This approach harkened back to the 
emergency measures of the Continental Congress during the 
American Revolution and the economic development strategies of 
the colonies prior to the Revolution.  It foreshadowed New Deal 
financing during the Great Depression and was also comparable 
to the low interest rate financing of the U.S. effort in World War 
II.  Perhaps an enriched view of this history will provoke fresh 
 
 6  Michael Tsang & Whitney Kisling, Obama May Inherit Bull Market After $6 
Trillion Loss, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601110&sid=akRyOGDs1EHI#. 
 7  See Jennifer Hughes, Drop in US inflows spooks dollar, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dda665fc-9e58-11da-b641-0000779e2340.html 
(reporting disturbing drop in U.S. capital inflows from approximately $3 billion a day to 
approximately $2 billion a day); US surprises: trade deficit down; budget shortfall up, 
MERCOPRESS, Aug. 13, 2008, http://en.mercopress.com/2008/08/13/us-surprises-trade-
deficit-down-budget-shortfall-up. 
 8  Rodger Runningen, U.S. Deficit to Reach Record $490 Billion in 2009, 
BLOOMBERG, July 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer= 
news&sid=ae7O8o2c0iNY. 
 9  Nelson D. Schwartz, Hearing Stimulas, Fearing Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, 
at B1 (reporting estimate by Niall Ferguson, a Harvard historian, that $2.2 trillion in new 
U.S. government debt will be issued in 2009, assuming approval of the stimulus plan). 
 10  MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 45 (1992). 
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insights about today’s financial difficulties and challenging 
institutional environment. 
I.  LINCOLN’S LEGAL TENDER ACTS 
When Lincoln was elected in November 1860, the money 
supply in the United States consisted of about 28% gold coins, 3% 
silver coins, and about 69% in bank created money, mainly bank 
notes and bank deposits (or check book money) created by state-
chartered banks.11  This was not a money supply conducive to a 
strong national government.  Indeed, on the day of Lincoln’s 
inauguration, March 4, 1861, the Union was on shaky ground.12  
When Fort Sumter was fired upon barely a month later, the 
Union Army had only 17,000 soldiers.13  Lincoln’s response was 
to organize the most impressive mobilization of military 
manpower in American history up to that time.  Within a year, 
the Union Army numbered nearly 200,000, by the end of 1863 it 
was more than 600,000, and by the end of 1863, the fateful year 
of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Union Army exceeded 900,000 
men.14 
The costs of this military buildup and the war were 
enormous.  According to William Hixson, the federal government 
spent about $35 million on the war effort in 1861.15  In 1862 it 
spent about $446 million, about a thirteen-fold increase.16  It was 
not enough.  Union wartime spending rose to $683 million in 
1863, $826 million in 1864, and $1.2 billion in 1865.17 
How was this war effort financed?  There was no federal 
income tax at the start of the war.18  Most federal revenues came 
from the sale of public lands and customs duties.19  But with 
homesteading rampant, public land sales revenue was falling.20  
Also, without duties on southern exports, and despite passage of 
 
 11  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129. 
 12  The day of Lincoln’s first inauguration, March 4, 1861, was also the birth of the 
college that would become Chapman University.  The History of Chapman University, 
http://www.chapman.edu/about/chapfacts/history/history2.asp (last visited March 14, 
2009). 
 13  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. at 132, 139. 
 18  Id. at 130. 
 19  Id. 
 20  The Homestead Act was passed in 1862.  LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR 
MODERN AMERICA: NONMILITARY LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS 108 
(Vanderbilt University Press 1968) (1968).  The Morrill Land-Grant College Act, which 
provided for use of public lands for establishing colleges, was signed by Lincoln in the 
same year.  Id. at 114–15. 
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the Morrill Tariff in the days before Lincoln took office, customs 
revenues began to fall as well.21 
In 1861, the nation’s fiscal house was in crisis when 
Congress authorized the Treasury to borrow $250 million by 
selling bonds to big banks and paying 7% interest.22  In July 
1861, in carrying out this Congressional authorization, Treasury 
Secretary Salmon Chase entered into agreements with the banks 
of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, which, like all banks at 
the time, were state-chartered banks.23  These banks were to 
purchase U.S. Treasury bonds with $50 million in gold.24  The 
plan was for the Treasury to then spend the gold back into 
circulation, which it hoped would then be deposited back into the 
banks, thereby allowing them to lend again and again to the 
Treasury.25  However, due to the psychology of fear and hoarding 
that swept the nation, the gold did not return to the banking 
system.26  The banks suspended payment in gold and so did the 
Treasury.27 
This left Chase with few viable options, hoping the banks 
would extend loans to the Treasury or pay for US Treasury bonds 
in the form of banknotes and bank credits rather than gold.28  
During the Buchanan presidency, the federal government was 
paying ruinous interest rates of 10 to 12%, and the yield would 
likely have to rise even higher to induce the banks to lend to the 
Treasury.29  This was neither a viable nor a sustainable option. 
Instead, Congress found other means, with Lincoln signing 
the first of three Legal Tender Acts on February 25, 1862,30 to 
create a new government-issued, irredeemable paper currency 
 
 21  SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 18; Roger L. Ransom, The Economics of the Civil War, 
EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, (ed. Robert Whaples), Aug. 25, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/ 
article/ransom.civil.war.us.  The North was harmed by the loss of tariff revenues from 
Southern cotton exports, as well as the loss of Southern purchases of Northern 
manufactured products.  Id. 
 22  SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 20. 
 23  Id. at 21. 
 24  Id. 
 25  See id. (Stating that “[i]n essence, though not in legal form, the banks were acting 
as underwriters”). 
 26  Id. at 27. 
 27  Id.; HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129–31.  In praising the “de facto regime of quasi-
free banking” prior to the Civil War, Hummel argues that the currency “consisted solely of 
state bank notes redeemable for specie on demand.”  Hummel, supra note 4, at 596.  This 
ignores the gold hoarding that preceded Lincoln’s inauguration and the suspensions of 
payment in gold later that year, indicating a failure in the free banking regime.  The 
weaknesses in the free banking regime were perhaps masked by major discoveries of gold 
in California beginning in 1849, but became apparent when gold production slowed at a 
time of rising public financing requirements.  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 121–31. 
 28  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 130–31. 
 29  SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 18. 
 30  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 131; SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 49. 
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(i.e., not redeemable in gold or other specie), United States Notes 
known as “the Greenback,” which were declared by government 
fiat to be legal tender for all private debts (hence, the term fiat 
money).31  By war’s end there would be nearly $450 million in 
these Greenbacks.32 
The Constitution provided no specific authority for Congress 
to create a currency, but neither was there any express 
prohibition on such Congressional power.33  At the time, 
numerous public officials, businessmen, bankers, and financial 
experts supported The Legal Tender Acts.34  They called on the 
federal government to assert constitutional authority over the 
currency and keep the profit from the issuance of currency for the 
taxpayer, a practice known as “seigniorage.”35  For instance, in 
the floor debate, Representative Thaddeaus Stevens argued that 
the government and not the banks should have the profit from 
creating a medium of exchange.36 
Lincoln himself wrote, in a letter dated December 6, 1864, 
that Treasury Secretary Chase had thought the issuance of legal 
tender notes was “a hazardous thing but we finally accomplished 
it and gave the people of this Republic the greatest blessing they 
ever had—their own paper money to pay off their debts.”37  
Although Chase had misgivings about the Greenback, by 
February 1862, Chase wrote, in a letter to the New York Post, “I 
 
 31  MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 45 (1992) 
(describing fiat paper money as “notes that are issued on the fiat of the sovereign” 
specified in value and declared as legal tender for payment of debts). 
 32  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 131; SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 49.  Congress began 
removing the greenback from circulation  in 1879 when it made the greenback redeemable 
in gold.  GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION 
AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 24, 38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997). 
 33  See HIXSON, supra note 4, at 89–90.  Delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
voted down a proposed clause that would have given the federal government specific 
authority to issue paper money, and also voted down a proposed clause that would have 
denied the federal government such authority.  Id. 
 34  The list of public officials included Congressional leaders, majorities in both 
houses of Congress, the President, an apparently reluctant but willing Treasury 
secretary, Salmon Chase, and Attorney General Edward Bates.  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 
131, 133-35, 150 (reporting the support of Henry C. Carey, the so-called founder of the 
American School of Economics); SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 30, 31, 35 (“Letters of support 
[for the first Legal Tender Act] from various bankers and business men pointed up the 
fact that the [opposing] opinions of the associated bankers [of New York, Boston, and 
Philadelphia] voiced in Washington, by no means represented the sentiments of the 
business community at large.”). 
 35  Seigniorage is defined as “the return on the monopoly right to print money held 
by domestic monetary authorities.”  PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS 491 (1997). 
 36  BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN 
THE CIVIL WAR 192 (1970). 
 37  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 133. 
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consent to the expedient of United States Notes in limited 
amounts being made a legal tender.”38 
Of the $3 billion direct cost of the war to the North, taxes 
paid for about 20 percent, borrowing in the form of bank paper 
covered about 65 percent, and the Greenback paid for about 15 
percent.39  The peak years for the new currency were 1862 and 
1863 when the Greenback paid for nearly 40 percent of the costs 
of the Civil War to the North.40  In his December 1862 message to 
Congress, Lincoln explained the necessity of the action: 
The suspension of specie payments by banks . . . made large issues of 
United States Notes [Greenbacks] unavoidable.  In no other way could 
the payment of the troops . . . be so economically or so well provided 
for.  The judicious legislation of Congress . . . has made them a 
universal circulating currency . . . saving thereby to the people 
immense sums in discounts and exchanges.41 
This was the same message to Congress in which Lincoln 
said:  
The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present.  
The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 
occasion.  As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.  
We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.42 
Some historians insist the Greenback was not necessary 
because it never accounted for a majority of the funds used to 
carry on the war and that the government may have been able to 
sell its securities below par.43  More persuasive are those like 
Leonard Curry, who concludes: “To leave the country dependent 
on a motley array of irredeemable, often counterfeited, frequently 
worthless bank paper was not only to invite, but to insure, 
disaster.”44  Likewise, historian Robert Sharkey points out that a 
majority of the members of Congress “were not willing to subject 
the credit of the government to such a trial.”45 
 
 38  Id. at 133–34. 
 39  Id. at 132–33, 139–40; Hummel, supra note 4, at 599, fig. 3.  Ransom put the 
direct government expenditure costs to the North at $2.7 billion and concluded that the 
Greenback accounted for about 18 percent of all government revenues.  Ransom, supra 
note 21. 
 40  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 132. 
 41  Id. at 134. 
 42  Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953) (1953). 
 43  See DON C. BARRETT, THE GREENBACKS AND RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS, 
1862-1879 25-57 (Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (1931); SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 32–33. 
 44  LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR MODERN AMERICA: NONMILITARY 
LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS 197 (Vanderbilt Univ. Press 1968) 
(1968). 
 45  SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 33. 
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In addition to the Greenback, Congress passed legislation in 
1862 creating the National Banking System, providing for the 
chartering of federal banks that were required to purchase large 
amounts of federal bonds to hold as security against the national 
bank notes they would issue.46  Although the National Banking 
System did not take the form of a central bank, it can still be 
seen as a forerunner of the Federal Reserve, also privately-owned 
and directed to support the federal government’s fiscal needs by 
purchasing federal bonds.47  While this was an improvement from 
the chaos that had preceded the National Banking Act, it was 
still lacking from the perspective of government finance when 
compared with the approach of the Federal Reserve during World 
War II, which kept interest rates near zero percent for federal 
government securities.48 
For the Confederacy, the cost of the war was about $2.25 
billion, of which about $250 million was raised in taxes and $500 
million was borrowed.49  The rest, about $1.5 billion, or nearly 60 
percent of the Confederacy’s war costs, was in printing press 
money.50  The Confederate currency collapsed in value, the victim 
of a counterfeiting war strategy by the North.51 
There has also been criticism of the inflation that coincided 
with the Greenback, with some claiming this was the result of 
not making the Greenback redeemable in gold.52  But, as 
discussed above, the record shows a rather wise management by 
Congress, with the amount of paper currency issued limited to 
only about 12 percent of the total financing of the war and 
peaking at less than 40 percent in 1862 and 1863.53  According to 
Roger Ransom, Northern wages did not keep pace with inflation, 
but fell by about 20 percent during the war.54  Even this, Ransom 
concluded, was not as severe as it would seem since agriculture, 
not industry, was the largest economic sector in the North, and 
“farmers fared much [better] in terms of their income during the 
war than did wage earners in the manufacturing sector.”55 
 
 46  Ransom, supra note 21. 
 47  Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 766 F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The Federal Reserve Banks are private 
corporations whose stock is owned by the member commercial banks within their 
districts.”) (citing to 12 U.S.C. § 321). 
 48  Richard H. Timberlake, Federal Reserve System, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FederalReserveSystem.html. 
 49  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 148. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
 52  FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 57. 
 53  Hixson, supra note 4, at 132, 140. 
 54  Ransom, supra note 21. 
 55  Id. 
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The inflation in the North was less a function of any over-
issuance of currency and more the result of a classic wartime 
boom with excess demand pulling up prices faster than 
manufacturing wages.56  Public administration was at a rather 
rudimentary and unsophisticated stage of development at the 
time of the Civil War.57  It would have to wait until the next 
century, after civil service reforms and the rise of a federal 
bureaucracy during World War II for the tools to contain such 
inflationary forces. 
For instance, throughout World War II, the federal 
government found the means to finance an even more impressive 
military buildup and war effort.  As a practical matter, the 
central bank lost its independence during the 1941–1951 
period.58  The Federal Reserve was required by political 
convention with the White House and Treasury to purchase 
government securities in any amounts and at any price needed to 
keep the yield on government debt pegged at near zero for short-
term securities and barely two percent for long-term bonds, the 
functional equivalent of printing money for the war effort.59 
With such an easy money policy during World War II, the 
federal government was able to increase wartime spending to 
nearly forty-five percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
nearly double today’s levels of federal spending.60  Some 
economists point to the easy money and heavy reliance on 
seigniorage during World War II to explain the end of the Great 
Depression.61  Of course, easy money without federal spending 
would likely not have increased either the velocity of money or 
aggregate demand.  While easy money in the 1930s brought some 
recovery from the Depression,62 it was only the massive fiscal 
 
 56  GEORGE T. MCJIMSEY, THE DIVIDING AND REUNITING OF AMERICA: 1848–1877 87–
89 (1981). 
 57  See Id. at 196–97. 
 58  See Timothy A. Canova, American Wartime Values in Historical Perspective: Full-
Employment Mobilization or Business as Usual, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13–14 
(2006) [hereinafter Canova, American Wartime Values]. 
 59  Id. at 13. 
 60  Timothy A. Canova, Non-State Actors and the International Institutional Order: 
Central Bank Capture and the Globalization of Monetary Amnesia, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 469, at 470–71 nn.8–9 (2007) (citing to tables of the 1984 and 2007 Annual Reports 
of the Council of Economic Advisers). 
 61  Hummel, supra note 4, at 605. 
 62  Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J. ECO. HISTORY 757, 
757–58 (Dec. 1992).  Romer cites to a 1956 article by E. Cary Brown for support that fiscal 
policy “seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery device in the ‘thirties—not because it 
did not work, but because it was not tried.”  Id. at 758. 
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stimulus, albeit accommodated by the central monetary authority 
that ended the Depression once and for all.63 
The economy roared, with real growth rates of greater than 
fifteen percent for three consecutive years, the fastest economic 
growth in American history.64  Yet, the federal government also 
managed to maintain price stability through a program of 
regulatory controls on prices, wages, and capital flows, and 
margin requirements on borrowing for private consumption, 
stock speculation, and housing construction.65  In fact, consumer 
price inflation was less than three percent a year for the final 
three years of the war.66 
The World War II model was actually extended for several 
years after the war, in large part because of the need for 
continued massive federal spending on the Marshall Plan 
reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the Korean War effort, and 
the G.I. Bill of Rights spending on education, health care, 
housing, and jobs for the sixteen million veterans of World War II 
(fully one-quarter of the U.S. work force).67 
This followed a long tradition of federal government 
intervention to promote economic growth.  For example, 
Alexander Hamilton, as Treasury Secretary, in his Report on 
Manufacturers, much of which was adopted by Congress, had 
called for subsidies to industry, paid for in part by tariffs on 
imports, to encourage the growth of manufacturing, as well as 
the building of roads and canals.68  Decades later, Henry Clay 
would incorporate Hamilton’s ideas into the “American System,” 
which was adopted by Lincoln in his fiscal program of subsidies 
to encourage economic development, which could be seen as a 
 
 63  Bruce Bartlett, The Real Lesson of the New Deal, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2009 (arguing 
that “in terms of fiscal policy, Roosevelt’s error [in the 1930’s] wasn’t that he spent too 
much, but that he didn’t spend nearly enough”). 
 64  Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 5 n.12. 
 65  Id. at 14–15, n.67. 
 66  Id. at 16.  Hummel seems to acknowledge that a central bank-dominated 
monetary regime is fully capable of producing high inflation and contributing less to 
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modification of mercantilism and a precursor to Keynesian 
economic policies.69 
To be sure, critics of this model will claim that the cure is 
worse than the disease, and that an easy money policy and active 
fiscal policy can work only if the federal government imposes 
controls which are said to be incompatible with a free-market 
economy, and that inflation is bound to return once the controls 
are lifted or relaxed.70  But this line of argument understates the 
range of government regulations and interventions that are 
routinely imposed on any free-market economy, even during 
times of hard money.  Further, it also ignores the moral and 
strategic context in which wartime controls have been imposed.  
If inflation is merely delayed, the question becomes what was 
gained during the interval of delay.  The World War II era 
controls that suppressed and delayed inflation until the late 
1940s and early 1950s provided the federal government with the 
breathing space and resources necessary to win a world war 
against fascist tyrannies in less than four years and then to 
rebuild war-torn Europe and Japan and integrate one-quarter of 
the U.S. work force.71  Not a bad trade-off, indeed.72 
Likewise, Lincoln used the resources of easy money for grand 
purposes.  It took four bloody years of fighting but the scourge of 
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slavery was finally lifted from the nation.  Both wartime 
presidents, Lincoln and Roosevelt, understood they could ill 
afford to lose their wars or pass them on to future generations.73 
As Justice Jackson would write in his concurrence in the so-
called Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. 
Sawyer (1952), “the power to legislate for emergencies belongs in 
the hands of Congress.”74  National emergencies and war need 
not expand the powers of Congress and the President, but they 
do provide the opportunity for the elected branches to act to the 
full extent of their constitutional powers.  This was the case with 
the constitutional legacy of the Legal Tender Acts that paved the 
way for other far-reaching monetary reforms during the New 
Deal. 
In June 1864, after securing re-nomination and with the 
financial position of the Union in better shape, Lincoln accepted 
the resignation of his Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase.75  
Several months later, partly to placate the Radical wing of his 
party, Lincoln nominated Chase as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.  In one of history’s great ironies, when the Legal Tender 
Acts were challenged, Chase would twice vote to declare the 
Greenback unconstitutional.76 
In Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), Chase refused to disqualify 
himself and in fact delivered the decision declaring the 
Greenback unconstitutional and ruling that Congress could not 
make the Greenback legal tender in payment of all debts, public 
and private.77  As characterized by Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz, Chief Justice Chase essentially convicted himself of 
having been responsible for an unconstitutional action in his 
prior capacity as Secretary of the Treasury.78 
At issue before the Court in Hepburn was the validity of 
contracts made before the war.79  The decision was applied also to 
contracts entered into after the war.80  A major portion of the 
nation’s money supply was suddenly rendered worthless for the 
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satisfaction of debts.81  But, then, two vacancies on the Court 
were filled by President Grant and amid charges of court-
packing, the Legal Tender Acts came up once again before the 
new Court.82  This time, in Knox v. Lee (1871), the Greenback 
was upheld as constitutional, reversing Hepburn by a 5-to-4 vote, 
this time with Chase in dissent.83  The Court held in Knox that 
Congress did indeed have authority to reasonably decide what 
definition of legal tender would best serve the public interest.84  
Finally, in Julliard v. Greenman (1884), in a third Legal Tender 
case, the Court upheld the power of Congress to create legal 
tender currency in peacetime.85 
During this time there were parallel Court decisions holding 
that the Legal Tender Acts were not intended to bar enforcement 
of private contracts requiring payment of debts in gold.86  Such 
“gold clauses” were a device to protect creditors from repayment 
in depreciated currency, particularly until the Greenback became 
redeemable in gold in 1879.87  Half a century later, by Executive 
Order in April 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the 
seizure of gold in an effort to forbid hoarding.88  Gold clauses 
were once again used to protect creditors.89  But later in 1933, 
Congress simply outlawed these gold clauses by joint resolution, 
and in 1935, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the joint resolution by a 5-to-4 vote, holding that Congress has 
authority to exert ultimate control in defining lawful media of 
exchange to satisfy debts, even for private contracts made prior 
to the legislation.90 
The cumulative effect of the Legal Tender cases and the gold 
clause cases was to permit Congress to once again authorize the 
issuance of Greenbacks, this time during the Great Depression.  
According to Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, the Thomas 
Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
authorized the issuance of $3 billion in United States Notes.91  In 
addition, the amendment authorized the Treasury to revalue its 
gold holdings and realize a large “paper” profit; as a result, it 
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could print additional paper money titled “gold certificates” to a 
nominal value of nearly another $3 billion.92 
Within each of these lines of cases, the Legal Tender cases 
and the gold clause cases, urgent circumstances existed that 
initially justified the use of positive regulation to compel citizens 
to accept government paper as legal tender for payment of all 
debts, private and public.  In both the 1860s and 1930s 
democracy and freedom were subject to the gravest of challenges.  
The responses of Congress and the President were similar.  In 
each instance, the federal government asserted sovereignty over 
the currency and financial system, thereby empowering the 
government with enormous fiscal capabilities that helped 
mobilize the nation for war and develop the country’s economic 
resources for decades. 
II.  EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 
Much like Lincoln’s Greenback, colonial governments issued 
paper currency that was not redeemable in gold and was declared 
by government fiat to be legal tender for the payment of debts.93  
The colonial currencies were lent into circulation through state-
controlled land banks and were secured by mortgages on the 
borrowers’ property at low interest rates, usually five percent.94 
According to historian James Ferguson, “[a] modern 
economist finds the tactics of colonial government analogous to 
those of the New Deal and in some ancestral relationship to 
present-day Keynesian doctrine.”95  For instance, during the 
Great Depression, first under Hoover and then under Roosevelt, 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation lent millions to U.S. 
industry.96  Likewise, the federal Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation, founded in 1933, offered mortgage loans directly to 
homebuyers at five percent with repayment periods of up to 
twenty-five years.97  But the moneys for these New Deal lending 
programs were mostly borrowed by the Treasury Department 
through the sale of government bonds.98  In contrast, some 
 
 92  Id. at 470, 518 n.33. 
 93  A. Barton Hepburn, History of Currency in the United States 71 (The Macmillan 
Co. 1915) (1915). 
 94  E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776-1790 5 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1961). 
 95  Id. 
 96  MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN 
AMERICA, 1933–1965 29(Oxford Univ. Press 1975)(1975). 
 97  C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS' LOAN 
CORPORATION 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1951);  
 98  GELFAND, supra note 96, at 48. 
CANOVA 10/15/2009 6:14 PM 
2009] Lincoln’s  Populist  Sovereignty 575 
colonial governments actually created the currency that was lent 
into circulation without incurring government borrowing costs.99 
While Lincoln’s Greenback was spent into circulation and 
earned no interest for the government, the colonial currencies 
were actually lent into circulation, thereby earning interest for 
colonial governments.  In fact, in the middle colonies, “the loans 
served as a substitute for taxes,” and the interest received by 
these colonial governments “was sufficient to pay most of the 
ordinary cost of administration.”100  While land banks were less 
successful in New England and the south, currency emissions in 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland were regarded 
as stable, and were never great enough in volume as to impair 
credit.101 
According to Ferguson, historians agree that Pennsylvania’s 
currency was held in universal esteem, a principal factor in the 
colony’s growth and prosperity, and maintained “without fear of 
repudiation and to the manifest benefit of the province”: 
Pennsylvania managed a land bank almost continuously after 1723 
without mishap.  For more than twenty-five years before the French 
and Indian War, the interest received by the government supported 
expenses without the necessity of direct taxes.  Relative freedom from 
taxation probably contributed to Pennsylvania’s remarkable 
growth.102 
None other than Adam Smith, the grandfather of classical 
economics, described the currency emissions in glowing terms: 
The government of Pennsylvania without amassing any treasure [i.e., 
any stock of gold or silver] invented a method of lending, not money 
indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its subjects.  [It advanced] 
to private people at interest, upon security on land to double the 
value, paper bills of credit . . . . made transferable from hand to hand 
like bank-notes, and declared by act of assembly to be legal tender in 
all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another.103 
According to numerous historians, the price level in 
Pennsylvania during the fifty-two years prior to the American 
Revolution and while Pennsylvania was on a paper standard 
“was more stable than the American price level has been during 
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any succeeding 50 year period.”104  This price stability was due in 
large part to the commonwealth’s wise management of its 
currency emissions.  In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, 
Adam Smith wrote: 
Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper 
money than any other of our colonies.  Its paper currency accordingly 
is said never to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which 
was current in the colony before the first emission of its paper 
money.105 
Thomas Pownall, also writing during this period, concluded 
that there “never was a wiser or better measure, never one better 
calculated to serve the uses of an encreasing country . . . never a 
measure more steadily pursued, nor more faithfully executed for 
forty years together.”106 
The British did not look favorably on the colonial practices, 
and the British Parliament passed the Restraining Act of 1764 
forbidding enactment of such legal tender laws.107  According to 
William Hixson, Parliament acted at the behest of British 
bankers who “wanted the colonies, rather than creating their 
own notes, to acquire a colonial money supply by borrowing 
banknotes in Britain (at interest payable in specie [i.e., gold or 
silver coin]).”108  Protests immediately broke out in New York, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, “colonies 
which were scarcely in the grip of leveling elements.”109 
Benjamin Franklin fought enactment of the Restraining Act 
of 1764 and tried to get it repealed.110  One of the main reasons 
for the alienation of the American colonies from the mother 
country, according to Franklin, was the restrictions on paper 
money.111  Franklin wrote, “Every colony was ruined before it 
made paper money” as gold coin was drawn away by the 
purchase of imports from Britain.112 
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The monetary experiment continued during the American 
Revolutionary War, which was paid to a remarkable extent by 
issue of paper currency known as the “Continental” despite an 
acute shortage of specie.113  But the paper money was issued and 
counterfeited in large quantities out of all proportion to increases 
in the output of goods and services.114  Therefore the currency 
declined sharply in value in terms of gold and silver, and there 
was runaway price inflation during the war.115 
Previously, in many of the colonies, counterfeiting was a 
serious problem that threatened and often did undermine the 
confidence and value of their currencies, particularly in the south 
and northeast colonies.116  Pennsylvania’s lieutenant governor, 
Patrick Gordon, in a speech to the state Assembly, warned: 
It may not unjustly be compared to the Poisoning the Waters of a 
Country; the blackest, and most detestable Practice that is known, 
and which the Laws of Nations, and those of War condemn even in 
declared Enemies; for as that destroys the Lives of the innocent in 
taking their Natural Food, this would effectively overthrow all Credit, 
Commerce and Traffick, and the mutual Confidence that must subsist 
in Society, to enable the Members of it to procure to themselves and 
Families their necessary Bread.117 
While most counterfeiting of colonial currencies had been 
carried on by private criminal gangs, with the advent of the open 
rebellion, the British made counterfeiting a wartime strategy.118  
According to historian Kenneth Scott, “for the first time in 
history, counterfeiting was resorted to by a government to 
undermine confidence in the currency, and thereby the credit, of 
the enemy.”119 
The Continental currency actually held its value during the 
first year or two of the Revolution even though it was not 
redeemable in specie.120  But as early as the first week of January 
1776, if not before, a printing press aboard the H.M.S. Phoenix, a 
British ship of forty-four guns lying in New York harbor, was 
turning out counterfeits of the thirty dollar bill of emission.121  
When New York fell to the British, it became and remained the 
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chief source of counterfeits made by the British or with British 
sanction.122 
The record is replete with evidence of a massive and largely 
successful counterfeiting effort by the British.123  Franklin wrote 
that “immense quantities of these counterfeits, which issued from 
the British government in New York, were circulated among the 
inhabitants of all the States, before the fraud was detected.”124  
This, he said, depreciated the whole mass, “first, by the vast 
additional quantity, and next by the uncertainty in 
distinguishing the true from the false; and the depreciation was a 
loss to all and the ruin of many.”125 
According to Scott, “[f]requently the colonies were put to the 
trouble and expense of recalling whole emissions.  Sometimes 
trade was greatly hampered or, as in Virginia in 1773, came to a 
complete standstill.”126  Moreover, the general depreciation of the 
Continental currency (hence the term, “not worth a Continental”) 
meant that the Continental Congress was forced to issue even 
more currency to pay for its war efforts.  While the specie value 
of the currency emissions remained roughly steady in 1777 and 
1778, a period of intense counterfeiting, the paper amounts of the 
currency issued rose sharply.127  A vicious cycle set in.  Previous 
counterfeiting and over-issuance was depreciating the currency 
so greatly while the demands of war remained so pressing “that 
money had to be printed every month, then every fortnight.”128  
In 1779, John Jay defended the issue of paper money and blamed 
depreciation on the widespread counterfeiting by the British.129 
Gouverneur Morris, the person chiefly responsible for 
planning the use of paper money, had previously been opposed to 
the project.130  But like others in the Continental Congress, he 
agreed that in a crisis, paper money was the only option 
available.131  Without the power to tax, however, the Congress 
had no effective means of retiring its paper money from 
circulation after it had served its purpose of paying for war 
provisions.132  Appeals were made to the states to tax a portion of 
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the paper money and send those back to Congress to retire the 
bills, but to no avail, the money was not forthcoming.133  The 
states did not come through, and this defect in the allocation of 
taxing authority contributed further to the depreciation in the 
currency.134 
Franklin was more sanguine than others about the currency 
depreciation which he viewed as “a kind of imperceptible tax” 
that was more progressive than other taxes:135 
The general effect of the depreciation [of Continental and state bills] 
among the inhabitants of the states has been this, that it has operated 
as a gradual tax upon them.  Their business has been done and paid 
for by the paper money, and every man has paid his share of the tax 
according to the time he retained any of the money in his hands and to 
the depreciation within that time.  Thus it has proved a tax on money, 
a kind of property very difficult to be taxed by any other mode: and it 
has fallen more equally than many other taxes, as those people paid 
most, who, being richest, had most money passing through their 
hands.136 
Franklin’s defense of the inflation tax was probably a 
combination of putting the best face on a bad situation, along 
with a vestige of his general enthusiasm with paper money going 
back to the pre-Revolutionary experience in colonial 
Pennsylvania.  While many were horrified by the depreciation 
and inflation, others believed the war could not have been fought 
and independence could not have been won without the issues of 
paper money.137  According to the historian Donald Stabile, 
“Highly regarded leaders such as Thomas Paine and Alexander 
Hamilton looked at the issuance of paper money as a necessary 
and a reasonable substitute for taxes.”138  Franklin stressed that 
when the war began, the colonies “had neither arms nor 
ammunition, nor money to purchase them or to pay soldiers” and 
it was the paper currency that allowed Congress to pay, clothe 
and feed the troops, fit out ships, and conduct the war.139 
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The numbers support these conclusions.  According to 
Hixson, the total cost of war for the American side was about 
$168 million and the original specie value of Continental 
currency issued was about $46 million, or nearly 40 percent of 
the war’s total costs to the colonies.140 
After the war, the Articles of Confederation marked a period 
of weak federal authority.  Class warfare between debtors and 
creditors broke out throughout the new nation during a time of 
such harsh treatment of debtors as debtor’s prisons.141  According 
to Hixson, “By the end of 1786, seven states had new issues of 
paper money in circulation—the size and legal-tender status of 
the various issues reflecting the balance of power between 
creditors and debtors of the particular states.”142  Not all state 
currencies were badly managed, but even where the legal tender 
bills were kept fairly steady, the problems of interstate commerce 
in a confederation with multiple currencies still existed.143 
The Constitutional Convention settled the issue in favor of 
creditor interests by adopting Article I, Section 10, forbidding 
states from emitting bills of credit (paper money) or passing any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts, which included debt 
contracts.144  In the drafting of the Constitution, creditor 
interests clearly had the upper hand.  Early American history 
has since been skewed against paper money.  As Ferguson 
concludes: 
Upon reviewing the evidence, it appears that the impression of 
colonial public finance conveyed by later scholars gives a misleading 
background for a financial history for the Revolution.  The efforts of 
the American provinces to create a medium of exchange, provide 
agricultural credit, and equip government with the means of incurring 
and discharging responsibilities, hardly constitute a “dark and 
disgraceful” picture, nor, on the whole, a record of failure.  Most 
colonies handled their currency with discretion and were successful in 
realizing the purposes associated with its use.145 
In creating the Greenback, Lincoln and the Civil War 
Congress had to overcome the traditional bias against a 
government-issued fiat currency.  The multiple interconnected 
crises that they faced—political disintegration, economic 
stagnation, financial panic, and military exigency—suggest the 
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nature of the sea change in conventional thinking.  Necessity was 
once again the mother of invention. 
III.  WHAT WOULD LINCOLN DO? 
Some economists dismiss the significance of Treasury-issued 
fiat currency by pointing out facile similarities with today’s 
system of Federal Reserve-issued fiat currency.  For instance, 
Hummel argues that the two processes work out roughly the 
same financially.146  The Fed creates money and loans it to the 
Treasury at interest; but after covering its operating expenses 
(several billion dollars), the Fed rebates around ninety percent of 
such interest payments (some tens of billions of dollars) back to 
the Treasury.147  This ignores that the money rebated annually is 
in the tens of billions of dollars, while the Treasury must pay in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars in interest to its bondholders, 
both domestic and foreign, who happen to also own shares in the 
Federal Reserve banks that take part in deciding the interest 
rate that Treasury will pay to its bondholders. 
Hummel makes an important concession about the difference 
between government issued currency and privatized currency 
issuance: “The one thing that does change under a central bank 
is who is in charge of issuing fiat money, and the resulting 
incentives.”148  Indeed.  When Treasury issues currency and 
spends it into circulation, it pays no interest.  When Treasury 
issues currency and lends it into circulation, it earns interest, 
and is thereby able to reduce the tax burden for taxpayers.  
When a central bank, like the Federal Reserve, issues currency 
and lends it to Treasury, it is that same central bank that now 
sets the rate of interest on all short-term Treasury borrowing, 
including the interest that Treasury pays to bondholders other 
than the Federal Reserve, such as the commercial banks and 
investment banks that hold trillions of dollars in Treasury debt 
and also happen to exercise formal and informal influence in the 
Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions. 
History bears out certain advantages that Treasury-issued 
currency has over a regime dominated by an autonomous central 
bank.  For instance, the Greenback allowed the North to issue 
currency and spend it into circulation without incurring interest 
charges.  However, to the extent that Greenbacks were 
insufficient in the amount of United States Notes actually issued, 
the North had to finance much of the rest of its war effort by 
 
 146  Hummel, supra note 4, at 604. 
 147  Id. at 604–05. 
 148  Id. at 605. 
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borrowing banknotes at significant interest rates, thereby adding 
to the burdens of future taxpayers.149 
Likewise, during World War II, the effect of central bank-
issued money was ameliorated by the fact that the Federal 
Reserve was not functionally independent and interest rates on 
all government debt were essentially set by the Treasury.150  As a 
result, the Treasury was able to borrow at near zero interest 
rates.151  This was the so-called “pegged period” in which the 
Federal Reserve kept interest rates pegged at 3/8 of one percent 
on short-term Treasury debt and about 2 percent for longer-term 
Treasury bonds.152 
By contrast, in more recent years, the Federal Reserve has 
set interest rates on all Treasury debt through decisions made by 
its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a committee which 
includes the seven members of the Fed’s Board of Governors, as 
well as the twelve unelected and un-appointed presidents of the 
regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are privately owned by 
the same commercial banks that have profited by the higher 
interest rates set by the FOMC on Treasury securities.153 
Several economists, including Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, 
have spoken of “cognitive regulatory capture” to describe the 
intellectual uniformity that has pervaded central bank thinking 
and let to the triumph of deregulatory ideology.154  With regards 
to the Federal Reserve, the agency capture is not just cognitive 
capture, but a matter of institutional design.  The presidents of 
the regional Federal Reserve Banks, though acting functionally 
as officers of a supposedly federal agency, are not appointed by 
the President of the United States and not subject to Senate 
confirmation.155  The Federal Reserve System further evades 
 
 149  HIXSON, supra note 4, at 139–42. See also BERT W. REIN, AN ANALYSIS AND 
CRITIQUE OF THE UNION FINANCING OF THE CIVIL WAR 31–51 (Amherst C. Press 1962) 
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 150  Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 13. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, 
and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1300 (2000) [hereinafter Canova, 
Financial Liberalization]. 
 153  See Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 21–22; Note, The 
Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private 
Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 116–18 (1989).  
 154  Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman on the Economy: The Return of the 
Depression Economics, The Washington Post (Transcript, Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2008/12/11/DI2008121102406.
html.  (last accessed August 16, 2009). 
 155  After Timothy Geithner stepped down as president of the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank to become Treasury Secretary, the New York Fed named William C. Dudley 
as its new president after a search headed by the chairman and deputy chairman of the 
board of directors of the privately-owned New York Fed.  There was no formal 
CANOVA 10/15/2009 6:14 PM 
2009] Lincoln’s  Populist  Sovereignty 583 
oversight by not relying on a penny of congressional 
appropriations, and by its exemption from various statutes such 
as the Federal Advisory Committee Act and certain provisions of 
the Freedom of Information Act.156  Finally, the governors 
themselves serve for fourteen-year terms, longer than three 
presidential administrations and longer than any other officer of 
the federal government.157 
Although the Federal Reserve rebates much of the interest it 
receives from the Treasury, it has traditionally set short-term 
interest rates much higher than during the 1941–1951 peg, while 
surrendering the long-term rate to market forces.158  As a result, 
the Treasury’s interest rate burdens have risen to enormous 
levels: net interest payments by the federal government have 
risen from about $14 billion in 1970 to $52 billion in 1980, $184 
billion in 1990, and approximately $250 billion by 2008.159 
To focus only on the interest payments rebated by the 
Federal Reserve to Treasury, while ignoring the Treasury’s 
enormous interest payments to private bondholders misses key 
differences between a regime of Treasury-issued currency and a 
monetary regime dominated by central bank-issued currency.  Of 
 
involvement by the Obama administration or Congress in the search, and certainly no 
input from any other interests from civil society.  Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank of 
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taxpayers made by the Fed and the assets the Fed is accepting as collateral.  Bloomberg 
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Fed’s express FOIA exemptions related to trade secrets and commercial information.  
Mark Pittman, Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion (Update 2), BLOOMBERG 
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programs.  Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 08 
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 157  See Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 22.  There have been 
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 158  Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 14–15, 21. 
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course, in addition to the interest paid by Treasury to private 
bondholders must be added the trillions of dollars in hidden 
subsidies and guarantees made by the Federal Reserve to prop 
up U.S. financial institutions, interbank lending, and money 
markets.  Last year, after the Federal Reserve subsidized J.P. 
Morgan’s $29 billion acquisition of Bear Stearns, former Fed 
Chairman Paul Volcker questioned the central bank’s 
independence.160  Since then the Fed has come to the rescue of 
other clients, including the American Insurance Group (AIG), 
Citigroup, and Bank of America, and creditors and 
counterparties of AIG such as Goldman Sachs and perhaps 
various favored hedge funds, while propping up financial 
markets for the same private financial interests.161 
The Federal Reserve, now the model of autonomous central 
banks around the world, is not a disinterested entity, but is 
stacked with the representatives of financial institutions that 
have numerous interests that conflict with the interests of the 
Treasury Department and the taxpayer.  The enormous transfers 
of wealth from the taxpayer to large financial institutions that 
are a central feature of a privatized system of money creation 
make little sense at any time, and particularly in a time of war, 
economic recession, or other national crisis.  Such wealth 
transfers apparently made little sense to Lincoln or Roosevelt, 
both of whom found ways around the straight-jackets of so-called 
“sound money” and “sound finance.” 
Roosevelt followed Lincoln’s wartime example by taking 
control of the commanding heights of finance to pay for the 
military effort in World War II.162  During Lincoln’s tenure, this 
meant having the Treasury issue currency directly into 
circulation, as authorized by Congress.  During World War II, it 
meant bringing the Federal Reserve under the direction of the 
Treasury to lend freely to the federal government.  In both of 
these models, the federal government asserted its financial and 
economic sovereignty to achieve the most important policy 
objectives of generations in crisis.  It is certainly fair to ask what 
a comparable assertion of financial and economic sovereignty 
would or should look like today. 
 
 160  Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Former Fed Chair Volcker: Financial Crisis not Over, 
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/telecomm/ 
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 161  Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Reports Loss of $61.7 Billion 
as U.S. Gives More Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/03/business/03aig.html. 
 162  Hummel, supra note 4, at 593. 
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The present financial and economic crisis, the worst since 
the Great Depression, has raised a range of proposals, most of 
which involve the expenditure of large sums of federal revenue, 
including the $787 billion fiscal stimulus, the $700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to assist financial 
institutions in distress, Treasury Secretary Geithner’s proposal 
to spend up to another $2 trillion of taxpayer money to purchase 
the toxic assets of failing banks in partnership with certain 
hedge funds deemed co-investors.163  The programs already 
authorized will add significantly to the federal budget deficit, 
which now exceeds $1.6 trillion and could soon approach $2 
trillion a year.  As Hummel correctly points out, all of this 
additional debt, much of it foreign debt, raises the specter of a 
possible sovereign default by the U.S.164 
The economic recovery of the 1930s, however insufficient in 
size, was spurred in large part by the monetary stimulus 
stemming from the devaluation of the dollar and inflows of 
gold.165  It could be that a similar devaluation, if done in an 
orderly way, could help inflate our way partly out of this debt 
deflation.  The experience of the 1940s suggests, however, that 
further fiscal stimulus may be needed to pull out of the present 
recession and keep the economy from falling into a deeper 
financial crisis and depression.  If what is needed is federal 
spending of the magnitude of the 1940s (recall, 45 percent of 
GDP), then several questions are raised: (1) what would be the 
appropriate outlets for spending when it makes no sense to have 
assembly lines producing aircraft carriers, tanks, warplanes, and 
other armaments; and (2) how to pay for such a massive fiscal 
stimulus. 
Perhaps a new G.I. Bill of Rights for the present generation 
would restore the purchasing power for the middle class to put 
the economy back on a growth path.  Others point to the vast 
physical infrastructure needs of the public sector, which has been 
estimated in the trillions of dollars just to repair roads and 
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bridges, as well as water, sewage, and other capital 
improvements.166 
One proposal that was rejected as an amendment to the 2009 
fiscal stimulus package would have authorized the Treasury to 
issue bonds for spending on transit, water, highway, bridge, and 
road infrastructure projects by federal, state or local 
government.167  One problem with this proposal, as with the 
entire stimulus package, is that it would have added to the 
federal deficit and national debt, made the U.S. more dependent 
on foreign borrowing, and possibly undermined the value of the 
dollar and stability of U.S. financial markets. 
A somewhat different approach was proposed in 1999 by 
Representative Ray LaHood (like Lincoln, a Republican from 
Illinois), who introduced legislation to create $360 billion in 
United States Notes to be lent interest-free to state and local 
governments over a five-year period to fund capital projects.168  
The bill, entitled the State and Local Government Empowerment 
Act, received about 22 cosponsors but never made it out of 
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committee.169  Significantly, Mr. LaHood is now Secretary of 
Transportation in the Obama administration.170 
Mr. LaHood’s proposal was a variation of the Sovereignty 
Loan Proposal, an initiative drafted by a private Illinois citizen 
Ken Bohnsack, and like the Sovereignty Loan Proposal, was 
modeled on Lincoln’s Greenback.171  Under the LaHood proposal, 
the annual increase in the money stock would be well below the 
current levels of money growth, and therefore no more 
inflationary than privately-issued currency by the logic of 
monetarists.172  In addition, the newly-issued currency could be 
removed from circulation when paid back to the Treasury, or 
circulated again in the form of new loans to state and local 
governments.  Most importantly, the $360 billion that would 
have been created under the LaHood proposal would not add a 
single penny to the federal deficit, the national debt, or foreign 
borrowing.  The federal government would incur no interest or 
principal obligations.173  Furthermore, if the issuance of these 
United States Notes were to lead to some devaluation of the 
dollar, perhaps that would provide some monetary stimulus to 
recovery. 
In addition to the needs of state and local governments, and 
proposals for fiscal stimulus to restore economic growth, there is 
the problem of the financial system itself.  The federal 
government has pumped nearly $700 billion into the biggest 
commercial banks, which were sinking under the weight of their 
declining portfolios of mortgage-backed securities, unmarketable 
derivatives, and other asset-backed securities.174  A number of 
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commentators advocated nationalization of these banks to 
restore them to solvency, with an eye to privatizing or converting 
them into banking cooperatives in the future.175  This might be 
one way to stop the financial hemorrhaging without having to 
spend billions or trillions more in taxpayer money. 
Others have proposed having the federal government and/or 
state governments charter and capitalize new banks, publicly-
owned and managed, to lend directly to U.S. businesses and 
consumers.176  To the extent new banks are capitalized by the 
federal government, this would once again provide an 
opportunity to finance the new investment through the issuance 
of United States Notes.  It could also suggest a return to the 
colonial model of public finance where the government itself 
lends money into circulation at interest, and with the interest 
earned thereby reducing the tax burden on ordinary citizens. 
Likewise, the proposal by Senate Republicans, also rejected 
during the fiscal stimulus debate, to have the federal government 
offer 30-year fixed rate mortgages at 4 percent, would have 
required some outlay of public funds, and presumably significant 
federal borrowing to finance the plan.177  If the federal 
government were to borrow at less than 4 percent, then its profit 
could be applied to pay for the difference between the new 4 
percent mortgages and today’s prevailing mortgage interest rate, 
which was estimated at above 5 percent.178  Once again, although 
not proposed by the Senate Republicans, this could have also 
presented an opportunity for the federal government to issue and 
lend currency directly into circulation and thereby reduce tax 
burdens by hundreds of billions of dollars from the interest 
earned on a high volume of such refinancing transactions. 
Finally, proposals to have state governments charter and 
capitalize their own banks would provide a way around the 
Article I, Section 10 prohibition against states emitting paper 
money.179  For instance, in 1919, North Dakota established the 
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Bank of North Dakota, the only state-owned bank in the nation, 
to lend funds to the private sector to encourage agriculture, 
commerce, and industry within the state.180  Created with $2 
million of capital, today the Bank of North Dakota operates with 
more than $160 million in capital, provides federally insured 
student loans, and draws on a deposit base that includes all state 
funds and funds of state institutions.181  While the Bank of North 
Dakota does not actually create currency, like the land banks in 
colonial America it does provide credit and, with any interest 
earned, reduces the tax burdens on its citizens. 
For the past generation, the economic orthodoxy has claimed 
that the Federal Reserve System, the model of an autonomous 
and largely unaccountable central bank, is the only alternative to 
allowing elected public officials exercise authority over currency 
and monetary policy.  But these pretensions of economics as a 
science have led to wrong-headed conclusions that government is 
incapable of resolving our most important problems and 
competing claims.  Today’s collapsing financial bubble economy 
suggests that we pay a steep price when letting self-interested 
bankers and their chosen technocrats monopolize these monetary 
functions.  Surely a central bank could be designed that ensures 
diversity of perspectives and a pluralism of interests while 
maintaining some degree of policy-making autonomy.  We should 
ask why there is no room for industrial capital, perhaps the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the representatives 
of industrial unions, public sector employees, and student debtors 
on the boards and committees deciding currency and monetary 
policy.  Instead of a marketplace of ideas and a forum to test 
one’s theories, our central banks have become echo chambers for 
flawed and outdated orthodoxies. 
Perhaps the most important questions we face are not those 
of economic science or competing models of public finance and 
currency creation.  Rather, perhaps they are political and 
strategic in nature and ultimately moral questions: whether we 
face existential challenges as great as did the generations of 
Americans who looked to Lincoln and Roosevelt for vision and 
leadership. 
According to Lincoln, “The monetary needs of increasing 
numbers of people advancing toward higher standards of living 
can and should be met by the government. . . . The issue of 
 
 180  Bank of North Dakota, http://www.banknd.nd.gov/bndhome.jsp. (last visited Mar. 
10, 2009). 
 181  About Bank of North Dakota, http://www.banknd.nd.gov/about.jsp (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2009). 
 10/15/2009 6:14 PM 
590 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:561 
money should be maintained as an exclusive monopoly of the 
National Government.”182  Lincoln’s approach to public finance, 
like Roosevelt’s, was one of populist economic sovereignty: the 
reassertion of democratic control of the financial system, as 
permitted under the Constitution, to empower the elected 
branches of government to meet the needs of the day in an hour 
of pressing need. 
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